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This paper examines the spillover effects of sovereign rating news on European financial 
markets during the period 2007-2010. Our main finding is that sovereign rating downgrades 
have statistically and economically significant spillover effects both across countries and 
financial markets. The sign and magnitude of the spillover effects depend both on the type of 
announcements, the source country experiencing the downgrade and the rating agency from 
which the announcements originates. However, we also find evidence that downgrades to near 
speculative grade ratings for relatively large economies such as Greece have a systematic 
spillover effects. Rating-based triggers may help explain these results. 
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I.  Introduction 
The ongoing European sovereign debt crisis has renewed the debate on the role credit rating 
agencies play during crises and the interdependence between different financial markets.  
This debt crisis has been the theater of sovereign credit rating downgrades, widening of 
sovereign bond and credit default swap (CDS) spreads, and pressures on stock markets. 
Interestingly, financial markets throughout the Euro zone have been under pressure although 
credit rating actions were concentrated in few countries such as Greece, Iceland, Ireland, 
Portugal and Spain (See Figure 1).  
 
While the current debate echoes previous discussions during the Asian crisis in 1997-98, the 
degree of financial integration achieved in Europe over the past decade offers unique 
conditions to study the impact of rating news on financial markets.  Ever since the Treaty of 
Rome in 1957, an uninterrupted series of deregulating measures especially in the banking 
sector have been put in place to foster European financial integration. The question at stake 
in the present paper is whether sovereign rating news, such as downgrades, have spillover 





































































Stable outlook (Moody's)4 
Conceptually, there are many potential channels through which sovereign rating news may 
have spillover effect across countries and across financial markets. One example is the 
holding of foreign sovereign debt by domestic banks. A sovereign rating downgrade in a 
given country is thus likely to affect the profitability of banks in other countries where banks 
are holding this debt. This is the case of Europe where banks hold at times substantial 
amount of sovereign debt in both their trading and banking books (see Blundell-Wignall and 
Slovik, 2010). Another example of channels through which sovereign rating news may spill 
over across countries and markets is when banks across countries hold claims on banks in 
other countries and are thus exposed to one another. This cross-holding feature is at the core 
of the European financial market convergence process in Europe.
2 Sy (2010) provides a 
comprehensive discussion of the channels through which sovereign credit rating 
announcements may spillover to other markets including as a result of rating-based triggers 
such as those in banking regulation, ECB collateral rules, CDS contracts or investment 
mandates. 
 
In spite of these channels, the literature on the spillover effects of rating news is sparse. 
Considering sovereign  bond spreads data from emerging markets spanning the period 1991 
to 2000, Gande and Parsley (2005) find that a country’s rating downgrade has a significant 
negative effect on the sovereign bond spreads of other countries. In integrated financial 
markets, however, one should expect rating downgrade to have effects beyond bond markets. 
Indeed, a nascent literature including Ehrmann, Fratzscher and Rigobon (2010) analyze the 
transmission of shocks both across markets and countries. They find evidence of substantial 
international spillovers, both within and across asset classes. Kaminsky and Schmukler 
(2002) provide some evidence that changes in sovereign debt ratings and outlooks affect 
financial markets in emerging economies. More specifically, they find that sovereign rating 
affect not only the instrument being rated (bonds) but also stocks. 
 
In line with Gande and Parsley (2004) and Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002), the present 
paper examines the impact of rating news on credit markets (albeit focusing on CDS 
markets) but  considers more systematically the potential spillover effects that structurally 
exist within different asset market classes using stock market indices as well as banking and 
                                                 
2 It has been stimulated by the first and second banking directive in 1977 and 1985. BIS (2010) provides figures 
on  cross-border holding across countries. 5 
insurance sub-indices. Also, the present paper is, to the extent of our knowledge, the first to 
focus on the spillover effects of sovereign rating news on mature markets namely Eurozone 
countries. Indeed, previous studies have focused on emerging markets where exchange rate 
fluctuations render difficult the identification of the effect of credit rating news. To do so, we 
use a VAR framework inspired from Favero and Giavazzi (2002) using dummies to capture 
the effect of sovereign rating news on various financial markets across countries.
3  
 
Our approach combines event study techniques with the interdependence literature (see inter 
alia Favero and Giavazzi, 2002) and allows identifying which markets and countries are 
affected by any given sovereign rating downgrade. We are also able to capture the dynamic 
spillover effect of rating news on different asset classes across countries by controlling for 
the lagged effects of the fluctuations in those assets.  
 
Our main finding is that sovereign rating announcements have statistically and economically 
significant spillover effects both across countries and financial markets implying that rating 
agencies announcements could spur financial instability. The sign and the magnitude of the 
spillover effects depends both on the type of announcements, the source country 
experiencing the downgrade and the rating agency from which the announcements originate. 
However, we also find evidence that downgrades to near speculative grade ratings for 
relatively large economies such as Greece have a systematic spillover effects across Euro 
zone countries (17 and 5 basis points increase respectively for Greek and Irish CDS spreads). 
Rating-based triggers used in banking regulation, CDS contracts, and investment mandates 
may help explain these results. 
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the rating 
announcements during the ongoing European debt crisis. Section 3 discusses the estimation 
strategy and data. Section 4 presents the main results. Section 5 presents robustness checks. 
Section 6 concludes.  
                                                 
3 This is shown to be equivalent to other empirical approach to identify contagion as documented in Dungey et 
al. (2004). 6 
II.  The European Debt Crisis through the Lens of Credit Rating Agencies 
We focus on the three major credit rating agencies, i.e. Fitch, Moody’s and Standard and 
Poor’s (S&P) making announcements of various types, namely rating changes (upgrades and 
downgrades), revision of outlook (positive and negative) and review for future rating 
changes. These different rating announcements can also occur simultaneously, even if rating 
agencies typically signal in advance their intention to consider rating changes. For example, 
Fitch, Moody’s and S&P use a negative “outlook” notification to indicate the potential for a 
downgrade within the next two years (one year in the case of speculative-grade credits). They 
also use negative “watch” notifications to indicate that a downgrade is likely within the next 
90 days. 
 
A.  Types of Credit Rating Announcements 
There were 71 rating announcements between October 2006 and April 2010 which 
constitutes the period of analysis for this paper. An exhaustive list of these news together 
with the countries subject to the rating announcement and the dates of occurrence is provided 
in Table 1. Table 2 summarizes the volume and  type of rating announcements broken down 
by credit rating agencies. It shows that out of the 71 announcements there were 29 rating 
changes mostly downgrades, 25 outlook revisions, 16 combined announcements and one 
review for future downgrade. S&P is the most frequent announcer (32 announcements), 
followed by Moody’s (29 announcements) and Fitch (10 announcements). 7 
Table 1: Rating Announcements 
 
Country Date Rating Announcements  Rating Agency
1 Lithuania 10/23/2006 Upgrade & Outlook revision Fitch
2 Iceland 11/20/2007 Outlook Revision S&P
3 Ukraine 6/12/2008 Downgrade & Outlook Revision S&P
4 Russia 10/23/2008 Outlook Revision S&P
5 Ukraine 10/24/2008 Downgrade & Outlook Revision S&P
6 Croatia 10/27/2008 Outlook Revision S&P
7 Romania 10/27/2008 Downgrade S&P
8 Bulgaria 10/30/2008 Downgrade & Outlook Revision S&P
9 Hungary 11/7/2008 Downgrade Moody's
10 Latvia 11/7/2008 Downgrade Moody's
11 Turkey 11/13/2008 Outlook Revision S&P
12 Hungary 11/17/2008 Downgrade & Outlook Revision S&P
13 Iceland 11/24/2008 Downgrade S&P
14 Iceland 12/4/2008 Downgrade Moody's
15 Russia 12/8/2008 Downgrade S&P
16 Czech 12/8/2008 Outlook Revision Moody's
17 Russia 12/12/2008 Outlook Revision Moody's
18 Ireland 1/9/2009 Outlook Revision S&P
19 Spain 1/12/2009 Outlook Revision S&P
20 Portugal 1/13/2009 Outlook Revision S&P
21 Greece 1/14/2009 Downgrade & Outlook Revision S&P
22 Spain 1/19/2009 Downgrade & Outlook Revision S&P
23 Portugal 1/21/2009 Downgrade & Outlook Revision S&P
24 Ukraine 2/12/2009 Downgrade Fitch
25 Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia 2/24/2009 Downgrade & Outlook Revision S&P
26 Ukraine 2/25/2009 Downgrade & Outlook Revision S&P
27 Greece 2/25/2009 Outlook Revision Moody's
28 Ukraine 2/25/2009 Downgrade & Outlook Revision S&P
29 Spanish 3/9/2009 Maintain Outlook Moody's
30 Hungary 3/21/2009 Downgrade Moody's
31 Slovakia 3/27/2009 Outlook Revision Moody's
32 Hungary 3/30/2009 Downgrade S&P
33 Ireland 3/30/2009 Downgrade S&P
34 Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 4/8/2009 Downgrade Fitch




Country Date Rating Announcements  Rating Agency
36 Latvia 4/23/2009 Downgrade Moody's
37 Lithuania 4/23/2009 Downgrade Moody's
38 Montenegro 4/30/2009 Downgrade Moody's
39 Ireland 6/8/2009 Downgrade S&P
40 Ukraine 6/12/2009 Downgrade Moody's
41 Kazakhstan 6/13/2009 Downgrade & Outlook Revision Moody's
42 Azerbaijan 6/19/2009 Outlook Revision Moody's
43 Ireland 7/2/2009 Downgrade Moody's
44 Turkey 9/18/2009 Outlook Revision Moody's
45 Portugal 10/29/2009 Outlook Revision Moody's
46 Ireland 11/4/2009 Downgrade Fitch
47 Iceland 11/11/2009 Downgrade & Outlook Revision Moody's
48 Turkey 12/3/2009 Upgrade & Outlook revision Fitch
49 Ukraine 12/3/2009 Downgrade Fitch
50 Greece 12/8/2009 Downgrade Fitch
51 Spain 12/9/2009 Outlook Revision S&P
52 Greece 12/16/2009 Downgrade S&P
53 Greece 12/22/2009 Downgrade Moody's
54 Iceland 12/31/2009 Outlook Revision S&P
55 Bulgaria 1/21/2010 Outlook Revision Moody's
56 Russia 1/22/2010 Outlook Revision Fitch
57 Ukraine 3/17/2010 Upgrade S&P
58 Ukraine 3/17/2010 Outlook Revision Fitch
59 Portugal 3/24/2010 Downgrade Fitch
60 Iceland 3/30/2010 Downgrade & Outlook Revision S&P
61 Lithuania 3/31/2010 Outlook Revision Moody's
62 Latvia 3/31/2010 Outlook Revision Moody's
63 Estonia 3/31/2010 Outlook Revision Moody's
64 Iceland 4/6/2010 Outlook Revision Moody's
65 Greece 4/22/2010 Downgrade Moody's
66 Iceland 4/23/2010 Outlook Revision Moody's
67 Greece 4/27/2010 Downgrade S&P
68 Portugal 4/27/2010 Downgrade S&P
69 Spain 4/28/2010 Downgrade S&P
70 Portugal 5/5/2010 Review Moody's
71 Ukraine 5/17/2010 Upgrade & Outlook revision S&P9 
Table 2: Rating Announcements by Rating Agency 
 
 
B.  Sequencing of Rating Announcements 
The rating announcements presented in tables 1 and 2 were concentrated over time. Figure 2 
describes the number of rating announcements simply distinguishing between positive and 
negative announcements. It shows that there were very few announcements before July 2008. 
This observation suggests that rating agencies have not anticipated the macroeconomic 
weaknesses of European economies consecutive to the financial crisis.
4 The pick of negative 
announcements has been reached in January 2009. The number of negative rating 
announcements has since then decreased but remains relatively large.  
 
This certainly reflects the unresolved nature of the European debt crisis. The number of 
positive credit rating announcements (mostly positive revisions of outlook) has also 
increased since October 2008.  This could also suggest that credit rating agencies anticipate 
that those rating downgrades are temporary and that in the future European countries would 
recover their pre-crisis grade. 
 
                                                 
4 Mora (2006) among others provides evidence of delayed sovereign rating announcements of credit rating 
agencies in the context of the Asian crisis. White (2010) provides an excellent overview of the literature on 
credit rating agencies including on the evidence of their sluggishness in making corporate rating announcements 
in the US. 
Rating changes 6 12 11 29
       of which upgrades 0 0 1 1
       of which downgrades 6 12 10 28
Outlook revision 2 14 9 25
     of which positive 0 7 6 13
     of which negative 2 6 3 11
     of which maintained 0 1
Combined announcements 2 2 12 16
      of which associated with upgrades 2 0 1 3
      of which associated with downgrades 0 2 11 13
Review 0 1 0 1
Total 10 29 32 71
                   Moodys Fitch S&P Total10 
Figure 2:  Positive and Negative Announcements over Time 
 
 
C.  Spatial Distribution of Rating Announcements 
Credit rating announcements are not only concentrated over time but are also concentrated 
spatially. Table 3 describes the number of rating announcements by regions and for a 
selected number of European countries. It indicates that Eastern Europe with 30 
announcements has concentrated most of the announcements. We observe that 8 rating 
announcement were issued for Baltic States and 2 for Central Asia. Among individual 
countries, Greece followed by Ireland has concentrated the highest number of rating 
downgrades. Iceland has the highest number of rating announcements in Continental and 


































Table 3: Geographical Origin of the Credit Rating News 
 
 
Overall, we expect those rating announcements related to Euro zone countries to have the 
strongest effect on their own markets but also to spill over to other countries and financial 
markets in the Euro zone. We also expect an effect of rating announcements about Eastern 
European countries, Baltic States and Central Europe to have an effect on Euro zone 
countries that have structural and strong links with them. For instance, Austria, France, 
Germany, and the Netherlands, have strong financial linkages with Eastern European 
countries, and are thus likely to be subject to spillover effects from Eastern Europe countries. 
We now turn to the systematic empirical analysis of the effect of sovereign rating news on 
other countries and markets. 
 
III.  Estimation Strategy and Data 
In order to investigate the effect of rating announcements, hereafter labeled as “rating news”, 
on a specific market i, most studies have so far used event study techniques.
5 This approach 
consists in explaining the return on market i (r
i) by a sequence of impulse dummies Dt 
                                                 








   Baltic states 3 3 2 0 8
   Central Asia 0 1 1 0 2
   Eastern Europe 12 10 8 0 30
Individual Countries
   Greece 5 1 1 0 7
   Iceland 2 4 2 0 8
   Ireland 4 1 0 0 5
   Portugal  2 2 1 1 6
   Spain 1 3 1 0 5
Total 29 25 16 1 7112 
characterizing the rating news released at time t.
 6  
 











t being i.i.d and white noise residuals. If the coefficient associated with Dt is significant it 
indicates that news D lead to an abnormal returns for the market i at time t. 
Equation (1) can be extended to represent the effects of a series of L news denoted D
j
t where 











Nevertheless, such a specification relies on two assumptions. First, it is assumed that market i 
is efficient as the return does not depend on past variables. In theory, the efficient market 
hypothesis implies that there should not be predictable changes in asset prices (see Fama, 
1970). The intuition behind such hypothesis is that if everyone believed that the price of a 
stock would fall tomorrow, they would bid down the price today and the price would thus 
adjust instantaneously. However, there is a large body of empirical literature providing 
evidence of departures from market efficiency. Second, such a specification relies on the 
assumption that financial markets are not interrelated. However, the literature on financial 
globalization has shown otherwise (see Granger et al (2000)). There are evidence of 
spillovers between countries and between markets within the same country. Those spillover 
effects can be of a long-run nature often referred to as “interdependence” and of a short-run 
nature often referred to as “contagion”. Using model (1’) to evaluate the impact of rating 
news on financial markets would lead to a bias not only in the scope but also in the 
magnitude of the estimation.  
 
Hence, our event study takes into account the potential linkages between markets. As in 
Favero and Giavazzi (2002), we consider a Vector Autoregression (VAR) framework. 
Variables are included in levels to allow for the possibility of long-run/cointegration 
                                                 
6 The impulse dummy is 1 at time t and zero otherwise. 13 
relationships.












t is a N-dimensional vector of asset prices (taken in logarithm) on market i, Φ (L) =I-
1 L - … - p L
p is a N×N lag polynomial with L
k yt=yt-k , vt, are reduced-form disturbances 
with zero means and constant covariance matrix with variances given by E [v
i
t,] = σ





t]=0 for inot equal to j.
Nevertheless, as the model is specified in levels, the impulse dummies D
j
t are not 
appropriate. To be consistent with the specification in difference as in equation (1’), 










t = Φ(L) Z
i








ij is a matrix N ×K, K being the number of credit rating news.  
 
Using such a specification will also allow us to obtain unbiased estimates of the effect of the 
rating news on market prices, disentangling the effects of the structural linkages between 






                                                 
7 Engle and Granger (1987) showed that considering a VAR in difference while there exists one or more 
cointegration relationships would result in biases in the estimators. 14 
IV.  Results  
 
The model is first estimated without dummies in order to exhibit the potential linkages 
between financial markets.
8 We then introduce all individual dummies at once in the VAR 
model using the rating announcements described in Section 2. Next, we proceed to estimate 
the average effects of those individual dummies along three different dimensions. First, we 
exploit the type of rating announcements that is whether the announcement is a rating 
change, an outlook revision or both to categorize the individual dummies. Second, the 
dummies are categorized on the basis of the region where the announcement originates from. 
Third, the dummies are categorized on the basis of the identity of credit rating agency which 
has issued the announcement namely S&P, Moody’s or Fitch. In the following, we present 
the results of our regression analysis aimed at identifying which feature of the rating 
announcements financial markets react to.  
 
The VAR model is composed of 4 equations each representing a given financial market 
namely sovereign CDS spread, banking stock index, insurance stock index and country stock 
market indices. It covers the 9 largest Euro-area countries: Austria, Belgium, France, Ireland, 
Italy, Germany, Greece, Netherlands and Spain and spans the period going from January 1, 
2007 to April 12, 2010, representing hence 856 observations.
 9  The data are all obtained 
from Datastream. All the series are taken in logarithms, except for the CDS spreads which 
are expressed in basis points. In order, to obtain robust estimators to possible remaining 
heteroscedasticity or/and autocorrelation in the residuals, a White correction is performed on 
the standard deviation of the estimated coefficients.  
 
A.  Preliminary Analysis 
In a preliminary analysis, unit root tests namely ADF, PP, KPSS confirm that each series 
contain a stochastic trend. Johansen-Juselius’ cointegration tests lead to accept that there 
                                                 
8  The optimal lag order of the model is fixed to one as suggested by the BIC information criterion. 
9  As these countries share the same currency namely the Euro, the exchange rate cannot constitute a 
transmission channel for the news. Hence, the foreign exchange market is not included in our system of 
financial markets. 15 
exists at least one cointegration relationship.
10 The results of the statistical test provide 
evidence for the existence of a long run relationship between the 4 financial markets under 
consideration in this paper. It is thus important to separate the direct impact of the rating 
news from the diffusion process between financial markets.  
 
Also, the results of the Hausmann test lead us to reject the equality of coefficients associated 
with news between any couple of countries at the 1 percent level. It suggests that there is 
heterogeneity of coefficients associated with the dummies across countries. Such a result 
highlights the transmission heterogeneity of rating news across European countries, 
preventing us to use panel data techniques assuming homogeneity across countries as in 
Gande and Parsley (2005) and Kaminsky and Schmuckler (2002). We therefore conduct our 
estimation for each individual country separately. 
 
B.  Interdependence between Markets 
 
The model is first estimated without considering any exogenous variables. It corresponds 
hence to model (2):  Z
i




t. Results are reported in Table 4. Each equation 
features a lagged endogenous variable. The estimated coefficient is statistically significant 
and is not different from one. This result thus confirms the previous findings from the unit 
root and cointegration tests. Interestingly, the coefficients associated with lagged values for 
the sovereign CDS spread and for other stock market indices and sub-indices are sometimes 
significant in the other corresponding equations. It highlights the existence of a transmission 
channel between the four different financial markets. It is thus clear that traditional event 
study, which does not take into account such interdependence between financial markets, will 
lead to spurious correlations. Indeed, not taking into account such interdependence would not 
allow discriminating between the impacts of the rating news per se and the diffusion process 
due to the structural relationship between markets.  
 
 
                                                 
10  The results of the cointegration tests are available from the authors upon request. 16 














We find that the nature of the independence between the costs of insurance against sovereign 
defaults, measured by CDS spreads, and stock market performance is country specific 
suggesting that the transmission of sovereign rating news into the economy could be 
channeled through various “points of entry” depending on the destination country. For 
instance, we observe for Spain that an increase in CDS sovereign spread leads to a decline in 
stock market performance including in the insurance and banking markets but not the other 
way around. In contrast, in the Netherlands, an improvement in the performance in the 
banking sub-index leads to a decrease in CDS sovereign spread while in Italy, the 
performance in the insurance sub-index and CDS sovereign spread affect each other in both 
directions.  
 
C.  Individual Credit Rating News 
The model is now estimated considering the individual dummies capturing rating news as in 
(3) Z
i
t = Φ(L) Z
i






The main result is that sovereign rating downgrades not only impact the financial markets in 
Austria Belgium France Germany Greece Ireland Italy The Netherlands Spain
Eq1: Banking 
  Banking  0.985 *** 0.946 *** 1.002 *** 1.026 *** 0.959 *** 0.965 *** 0.987 *** 0.993 *** 1.007 ***
  Insurance  -0.015 0.011 -0.056 ** -0.023 -0.011 -0.001 -0.042 0.001 -0.007
  Stock market  0.033 0.055 ** 0.046 -0.014 0.056 * 0.048 * 0.040 0.053 -0.021
  CDS 0.00007 -0.00026 * -0.0002 0.00034 -0.00005 * -0.0002 -0.00007 0.00022 -0.00008 *
Eq2: Insurance 
  Banking  0.010 -0.048 0.023 0.016 ** 0.002 0.000 0.068 *** 0.013 ** 0.050 **
  Insurance  0.959 *** 0.983 *** 0.927 *** 0.961 *** 0.974 *** 0.967 *** 0.958 *** 0.954 *** 0.963 ***
  Stock market  0.023 0.132 0.028 0.011 0.030 0.044 ** -0.045 0.035 -0.048
  CDS 0.00007 -0.00005 -0.00027 ** 0.00016 -0.00002 -0.00004 0.00001 -0.00014 -0.0001 ***
Eq3: Stock market 
  Banking  0.008 -0.019 ** 0.018 0.018 ** -0.024 -0.003 0.02 0.002 0.008
  Insurance  0.001 0.003 -0.033 ** -0.004 -0.008 0.001 -0.027 0.010 * -0.002
  Stock market  0.996 *** 1.022 *** 1.000 *** 0.970 *** 1.034 *** 1.004 *** 0.994 *** 1.006 *** 0.976 ***
  CDS 0.00007 -0.00009 -0.0001 0.00009 -0.00003 0.00000 -0.00003 -0.00005 -0.00007 *
Eq4:  CDS 
  Banking  -14.510 ** 1.576 -3.503 ** -3.167 *** 13.740 *** -0.626 -4.838 1.800 ** -1.729
  Insurance  -4.712 -1.385 ** 4.482 ** 3.385 ** 0.660 3.064 * 12.600 *** -6.438 3.064 *
  Stock market  12.580 ** 0.112 -0.397 0.167 -18.407 -6.296 -7.995 -9.594 -0.871
  CDS 0.94400 *** 0.99100 *** 0.988 *** 0.954 *** 1.000 *** 0.980 *** 0.979 *** 0.829 *** 0.997 ***
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.117 
the country subject to the rating announcement but also in other Euro zone countries 
implying that rating agencies announcements could spur financial instability.   
Given the large number of coefficients associated with the individual dummies, the 
estimation results are not reported here.
11 In the following sub-sections, we provide evidence 
that the sign and magnitude of the spillover effects depend both on the type of 
announcements, the source country experiencing the downgrade and the rating agency from 
which the announcements originates. 
 
However, some rating announcements such as rating downgrades near speculative grade (e.g. 
Downgrade of Greece to BBB+ from A- by Fitch on December 8, 2009) have a systematic 
spillover effects across Euro zone countries.
12 We find those effects not only to be 
statistically but also economically significant. Indeed, we estimate the individual effect of 
this specific downgrade of Greece to increase CDS spread by 17 basis points for Greece but 
also to increase other Euro zone countries CDS spread. Indeed, we evaluate that Irish CDS 
spread would increase by 5 basis points consecutively to this particular Greece downgrade. If 
one recalls that Greece’s bond issuance in March 2010 amounted to €5 billion, the increase in 
the cost of protecting against a sovereign default resulting from this Greece downgrade  
would have amounted to €8.5 million for Greece but also by €2.5million for Ireland, even so 
the latter country’s rating would have remained unchanged.  
For the other rating announcements, as discussed earlier, the sign and magnitude of the effect 
of news depend on the country from which the credit rating news originates.  More 
specifically, we observe that the nature of the announcements and the linkages between 
destination and source country can explain the scope and the market through which the 
transmission operates. For instance, the downgrade of Iceland credit rating on November 24, 
2008 spilled over Austrian stock market including the banking and insurance sectors but did 
not affect the sovereign CDS spread. In contrast, Romania credit rating downgrade on 
October 10, 2008 spilled over sovereign CDS spread and across stock market in the 
Netherlands and Austria.  
                                                 
11 These results are available from the authors upon request 
12  Testing for the existence of threshold effects or more generally exploiting the rating scale is rendered uneasy 
given the concentration of rating grades in European countries. Indeed, there was no downgrade to 
speculative grade during the period under consideration.  18 
 
In the following sub-sections, we provide estimates of average effects along various 
dimensions including the geographical origin of news.  
 
D.  Average Effects of Rating Changes and of Outlook Revisions 
We now investigate the average effect of a rating change, denoted thereafter (A), outlook 
revision denoted (OR) and a combined announcements that is a rating change coupled with 
an outlook revision denoted (CA). We construct 3 different impulse dummies (DA, DOR and 
DCA) from the historical rating news sequence. The respective step dummies (SDA, SDOR 
and SDCA) are then constructed as the sum of the impulse dummies, e.g. SDAt=
t
i=1 DAi.  
 
The specification can be expressed as follows:  
Z
i




i2 SDORt + b




Table 5 Panel 1 in Appendix 1 provides estimates of the average marginal effect of the 
various types of rating news. We find that that the type of rating news matters when 
considering the potential news spillover across markets and countries. Indeed, rating changes 
mostly downgrades in specific country are associated with positive spillover in the other 
countries (“flight to safety”) while outlook revisions are associated with negative spillovers 
(“contagion”). This pattern continues to hold when we split the combined announcements 
into its two sub-components, as shown in Table 5 Panel 2. It should be noted however that 
the statistical significance of the average effects is limited. This could be explained by the 
averaging out of individual effects. As a result, in the next sub-sections we further split the 
type of rating announcement by region and by rating agency. We find the same sign pattern 







Table 5: Average Marginal Effect by Type of Rating Announcements 
   Panel 1 
 




The sign pattern associated with outlook revisions could suggest that financial markets react 
in a forward looking manner and expect the identified risks for a specific country to spread 
over other countries. Or, the outlook revision could be perceived as revealing information 
relating to a common risk across European countries. Conversely, the sign pattern associated 
Austria Belgium France Germany Greece Ireland Italy The Netherlands Spain
Eq1: Banking 
  Rating changes 0.0010 0.0014 0.0019 -0.0021 0.0027 ** 0.0022 0.0006 -0.0021 0.0023 **
 Outlook revision -0.0014 -0.0008 -0.0026 0.0003 -0.0012 -0.0083 * -0.0007 -0.0032 -0.0007
 Combined announcements  0.0008 -0.0012 0.0003 0.0030 -0.0021 0.0053 -0.0003 0.0058 -0.0010
Eq2: Insurance
  Rating changes -0.0005 0.0000 0.0015 -0.0005 0.0014 0.0010 0.0008 0.0063 ** 0.0018
 Outlook revision -0.0010 -0.0034 -0.0016 0.0001 0.0005 -0.0050 * 0.0000 -0.0048 ** 0.0002
 Combined announcements  0.0018 0.0038 -0.0002 0.0007 -0.0046 ** 0.0059 * -0.0013 -0.0018 -0.0020 *
Eq3: Stock market 
  Rating changes 0.0004 0.0003 0.0012 -0.0003 0.0017 * 0.0004 0.0003 0.0022 ** 0.0017 **
 Outlook revision -0.0008 -0.0005 -0.0011 0.0002 -0.0013 -0.0014 -0.0002 -0.0012 * -0.0004
 Combined announcements  0.0007 0.0003 -0.0004 0.0004 -0.0010 0.0017 -0.0002 -0.0007 -0.0008
Eq4:  CDS 
  Rating changes 0.2871 0.0541 -0.0394 0.1902 ** -0.2610 -0.3614 -0.0768 -2.0142 *** 0.0525
 Outlook revision -0.0180 0.2546 0.1868 -0.0311 0.8047 0.6431 ** 0.1942 0.7086 ** 0.3544
 Combined announcements  -0.4033 -0.4685 ** -0.1249 -0.2440 ** -0.1450 -0.4111 -0.0104 1.5979 *** -0.3190
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Austria Belgium France Germany Greece Ireland Italy The Netherlands Spain
Eq1: Banking 
  Rating changes 0.0013 0.0009 0.0021 -0.0007 0.0020 * 0.0052 0.0006 0.0010 0.0017 *
 Outlook revision -0.0013 -0.0010 -0.0024 0.0010 -0.0020 -0.0067 -0.0008 -0.0011 -0.0013
Eq2: Insurance 
  Rating changes 0.0005 0.0020 0.0014 -0.0002 0.0000 0.0037 * 0.0003 0.0054 *** 0.0008
 Outlook revision -0.0005 -0.0026 -0.0016 0.0002 -0.0008 -0.0036 -0.0004 -0.0054 *** -0.0007
Eq3: Stock market 
  Rating changes 0.0007 0.0004 0.0011 -0.0002 0.0014 0.0011 0.0002 0.0017 *** 0.0012 *
 Outlook revision -0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0012 0.0003 -0.0015 -0.0011 -0.0003 -0.0015 ** -0.0009
Eq4:  CDS 
  Rating changes 0.0956 -0.1655 -0.0979 0.0755 -0.4062 -0.5483 ** 0.1101 -1.1990 *** -0.1267
 Outlook revision -0.1187 0.1614 0.1245 -0.0898 0.6664 0.5459 * 0.1751 1.2350 *** 0.1870
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.120 
with rating changes could result from the fact that financial markets react to downgrades by 
fire-selling the downgraded bonds while buying other European countries’ bond. This could 
be explained by ratings-based rules such as those in banking regulation, ECB collateral rules, 
“credit events” in CDS contracts or institutional investors’ investment policies.  
 
The importance of the ratings in the prudential and regulatory system can help explain the 
difference in the effect of credit downgrades as opposed to outlook revisions on CDS spreads 
and stock market indices and sub-indices. Indeed, under the 2004 Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS) capital adequacy framework (Basel II), banks can use ratings 
assigned by recognized credit rating agencies to determine credit risk weights for their credit 
exposures. This framework is currently under review but this adequacy framework can help 
explain why banks would react differently to various rating announcements.
13 
 
The ECB collateral rules can also help explain the dichotomous effects of rating downgrades 
as opposed to revisions of outlook. Indeed, under the Eurosystem Credit Assessment 
Framework (ECAF), there are specific rules governing the quality of the Government bonds 
that banks can use as collateral in exchange for funding. To be eligible for collateral, 
securities had to be assigned a credit rating above a pre-set minimum of BBB-. As a result, 
banks could not obtain funding for collateral with a rating lower than the minimum. In 
contrast, the higher the rating, the lower the haircut banks will pay.   
 
In addition, a credit downgrade is a “credit event” in a CDS contract which typically 
increases the cost of insurance and triggers a collateral call for the insurance seller. Credit 
derivative product companies typically need an AAA rating to avoid posting collateral upon 
marked-to-market changes in their derivatives positions. Credit rating downgrades lead such 
companies, as per their derivatives contract, to post more collateral. Furthermore, collateral 
calls can occur if the issuer of the underlying securities is itself downgraded.
14  
                                                 
13  In 2009, the Basel Committee revised its risk-based capital framework so as to strengthen it. For instance, it 
introduced operational criteria to require banks to undertake independent analyses of the creditworthiness of 
their securitization exposures. 
14 In the US, this is illustrated by the threat by a credit rating agency to downgrade AIG in September 2008 
which led to multiple collateral calls, increased liquidity stress, and falling market confidence. 21 
 
Finally, the investment policy of institutional investors such as pension funds typically relies 
on credit ratings to restrict the types of assets in which they can invest. For instance, a 
pension fund which can only invest in investment grade European sovereign bonds would 
have to sell some assets of its portfolio should their ratings fall in the speculative grade 
category following a credit downgrade. 
 
E.  Average Effect of Rating Changes by Region of Origin 
We now turn to estimating the average spillover effects of rating announcements originating 
from three different groups of countries. Instead of considering the individual credit rating 
news, we now investigate the average effect of Eurozone countries’ rating announcements, 
denoted thereafter (Euro), Eastern Europe (East) and peripheral European countries (Peri).
15 
Then, 3 different impulse dummies (Euro, East and Peri) are built from the historical rating 
news sequence. They are 1 each time the respective rating announcement occurs and 0 
otherwise. The respective step dummies (SEuro, SEast and SPeri) are then constructed as 
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15 Peripheral European countries comprise Baltic states and Central Asian countries. 22 
 


















The above mentioned table displays the results of the estimation for originating from three 
groups of countries. Overall, we confirm the results from the above sub-section that on 
average, rating announcements originating from Euro zone countries have a more systematic 
spillover-effect across the countries under consideration. When comparing the average 
coefficient, news originating from Eastern European countries and peripheral Europe are 
lower than the coefficients associated with Euro zone rating announcements. We also find 
that countries like the France, Netherlands and Germany are subject to spillovers from news 
originating from Eastern Europe and peripheral Europe suggesting that banking linkages 
between countries play a key role in the transmission channels of sovereign news. 
Austria Belgium France Germany Greece Ireland Italy The Netherlands Spain
Rating change Eq1: Banking
Greece Iceland Ireland Portugal Spain -0.001 -0.001 0.006 *** 0.000 0.006 ** 0.000 0.001 -0.007 0.004 **
Eastern Europe 0.003 0.000 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 0.019 * -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
Peripheral Europe -0.001 0.002 0.008 ** 0.000 0.002 -0.010 0.002 0.004 0.006 **
Outlook revision
Greece Iceland Ireland Portugal Spain 0.000 -0.004 -0.003 0.003 -0.004 ** -0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.002
Eastern Europe -0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.015 ** 0.002 0.005 -0.001
Peripheral Europe 0.002 0.003 -0.010 *** -0.003 -0.005 0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.002
Rating change Eq2: Insurance
Greece Iceland Ireland Portugal Spain -0.004 -0.014 0.005 ** 0.000 0.012 *** -0.006 0.000 0.009 0.004 **
Eastern Europe 0.001 0.004 -0.006 ** -0.005 ** 0.006 ** 0.002 -0.001 0.005 0.000
Peripheral Europe -0.002 0.003 0.007 * 0.002 -0.008 ** 0.005 0.000 0.007 0.002
Outlook revision
Greece Iceland Ireland Portugal Spain 0.000 0.001 -0.005 ** 0.000 -0.009 *** 0.005 -0.001 -0.013 -0.003
Eastern Europe 0.002 ** 0.000 0.006 *** 0.005 ** -0.003 -0.001 0.002 0.001 0.000
Peripheral Europe 0.003 0.008 -0.009 *** -0.004 ** -0.004 ** -0.003 -0.001 -0.010 -0.002
Rating change Eq3: Stock Market
Greece Iceland Ireland Portugal Spain -0.001 0.000 0.004 ** 0.000 0.005 ** 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.003 ***
Eastern Europe 0.000 -0.001 -0.004 ** -0.003 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001
Peripheral Europe 0.001 0.002 0.005 ** 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.004 0.004 **
Outlook revision
Greece Iceland Ireland Portugal Spain 0.001 -0.001 -0.003 *** 0.000 -0.003 0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.002 **
Eastern Europe 0.001 0.001 0.003 *** 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.002 ** 0.001 -0.001
Peripheral Europe -0.001 -0.001 -0.007 *** -0.002 -0.005 ** -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.002
Rating change Eq4: CDS
Greece Iceland Ireland Portugal Spain 0.829 * 0.146 0.557 *** 0.441 *** 0.443 1.092 0.746 ** 0.170 0.012
Eastern Europe 0.450 -0.686 0.080 -0.041 -0.228 -0.175 0.029 -3.890 *** 0.248
Peripheral Europe -0.369 0.319 -0.300 0.143 -0.961 -1.458 -0.469 2.087 *** -0.685
Outlook revision
Greece Iceland Ireland Portugal Spain -0.365 0.386 -0.094 -0.143 -0.458 -0.298 -0.299 0.490 -0.024
Eastern Europe -0.311 0.272 -0.059 -0.072 1.079 0.941 * 0.273 3.437 *** 0.101
Peripheral Europe -0.596 -0.486 * -0.250 -0.471 *** 0.557 -0.952 -0.438 -3.346 *** 0.521
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.123 
 
 
F.  Announcement by Different Credit Rating Agencies 
In a final experiment, we categorize each of the previously used step dummies (SDA and 
SDOR) relatively to the credit rating agency that issued it. This should help assess the 
relative role of each of these agencies in the rating news spillover. The estimated model thus 
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t  , (5)  
 
where SP refers to S&P, M to Moody’s and F to Fitch. Table 7 provides estimates of the 
average marginal effect by credit rating agency. When comparing the coefficient degree of 
statistical significant, we find that S&P rating announcement have far reaching consequence 
in terms of spillover effect compared to Moody’s and Fitch. Fitch announcements have the 
least spillover effects. The spillover effects of Fitch rating announcements are also confined 
to CDS sovereign spreads while S&P and Moody’s have spillover across other financial 
markets. This could be explained by the anteriority of S&P and Moody’s compared to Fitch. 
Financial markets are indeed selective in the way they react to the rating news from different 
rating agencies. This suggests that the communication strategy of those rating agencies play a 




























V.  Robustness Checks 
In this subsection, we conduct two robustness checks. First, we address a potential omitted 
variables bias resulting from the omission of US stock performance in our analysis. To do so, 
we control for the US stock market performance. Second, we re-estimate the model 
considering only the CDS and stock markets.
16  
 
                                                 
16 These tables of results are available from the authors upon request. 
Austria Belgium France Germany Greece Ireland Italy The Netherlands Spain
Rating change Eq1: Banking
  S&P 0.006 ** 0.009 ** 0.013 *** 0.006 0.008 *** 0.019 * 0.008 *** 0.015 *** 0.006 **
  Moody's -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 ** -0.002 -0.004 -0.004 ** -0.004 -0.001
  Fitch 0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.001 -0.007 -0.001 -0.007 ** 0.002
Outlook revision
  S&P -0.004 ** -0.006 ** -0.011 *** -0.003 -0.006 *** -0.007 -0.006 *** -0.007 ** -0.007 ***
  Moody's 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 -0.006 0.002 -0.004 0.004 **
  Fitch -0.003 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.009 0.001 0.003 -0.005 *
Rating change Eq2: Insurance 
  S&P 0.006 *** 0.011 0.013 *** 0.005 ** 0.004 0.019 *** 0.004 ** 0.023 *** 0.004
  Moody's -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 ** 0.000 -0.007 * -0.002 ** 0.003 0.000
  Fitch -0.004 -0.003 -0.006 -0.003 0.007 * -0.006 0.000 -0.011 ** 0.001
Outlook revision
  S&P -0.003 -0.004 -0.010 *** -0.004 ** -0.004 -0.008 -0.003 *** -0.018 *** -0.005 **
  Moody's 0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.007 ** 0.000 0.001 -0.003 0.001
  Fitch 0.003 -0.006 0.009 *** 0.004 ** 0.009 -0.005 0.002 0.011 ** 0.000
Rating change Eq3: Stock market
  S&P 0.006 *** 0.005 ** 0.007 *** 0.003 0.007 *** 0.005 ** 0.006 *** 0.007 *** 0.004 **
  Moody's -0.003 -0.002 ** 0.000 -0.002 ** -0.001 -0.003 *** -0.003 0.001 0.000
  Fitch -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.004 ** 0.002
Outlook revision
  S&P -0.003 -0.003 *** -0.006 *** -0.002 ** -0.005 ** -0.003 -0.004 *** -0.006 *** -0.004 ***
  Moody's 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.002
  Fitch 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.002 0.004 ** -0.003
Rating change Eq4: CDS
  S&P -1.214 ** -1.323 *** -0.543 -0.385 ** -1.526 ** -1.302 * -0.320 1.481 * -1.209 ***
  Moody's 0.736 0.595 ** 0.101 0.37 *** 0.718 0.756 0.178 -1.172 ** 0.485 **
  Fitch 1.128 ** 0.020 0.701 0.406 ** 0.855 0.100 0.508 -1.541 * 0.554
Outlook revision
  S&P 0.821 ** 0.951 *** 0.470 0.255 * 1168 ** 1183 ** 0.400 -0.160 0.909 ***
  Moody's -0.716 -0.355 -0.285 -0.408 *** -0.666 -1.294 ** -0.499 -0.770 ** -0.234
  Fitch -1.083 * 0.050 -0.136 -0.224 0.976 1.762 ** 0.540 3.109 *** -0.129
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.125 
An important motivation behind the first robustness checks is the study by Erhmann and al. 
(2009) which does find that the US stock market does have significant effect on the European 
market. However, when introducing two lags in the various equation of our VAR estimation, 
the coefficients associated with those lagged values turn out to be insignificant in all 
equations while the coefficient associated with news remained virtually similar to the one 
obtained when not controlling for the performance of the US stock market. This confirms 
that the US stock market performance has been so far unrelated to the ongoing European debt 
crisis.
17 Second, the estimation of a bivariate model including CDS and stock markets only 
leads to qualitatively different results. This suggests that a bias arises from omitting to 
consider separately the banking and insurance market. This further suggests that even so the 
European Crisis is a sovereign crisis by nature, the spillover effects go well beyond sovereign 
CDS markets. 
VI.  Conclusion 
The paper has examined the spillover effects of sovereign rating news across countries and 
financial markets using daily data on sovereign credit default swaps (CDS) spreads, stock 
market indices and sub-indices for banking and insurance for selected European countries 
during the period 2007-2010. It finds that sovereign rating downgrades have statistically and 
economically significant spillover effects both across countries and financial markets 
implying that rating agencies announcements could spur financial instability. Those spillover 
effects depend both on the type of rating announcements, on the source country experiencing 
the downgrade and the rating agency from which the announcements originates from. 
However, we also find evidence that some rating announcements such as rating downgrades 
near speculative grade (e.g. downgrade of Greece to BBB+ from A- by Fitch on December 8, 
2009) have a systematic spillover effects across Euro zone countries under consideration (17 
and 5 basis points increase respectively for Greek and Irish CDS spreads). Rating-based 
triggers used in banking regulation, CDS contracts, and investment mandates may help 
explain these results. 
 
Our results have important policy implications and suggest three possible avenues to address 
the risks from spillovers. First, as soon as other countries are downgraded, policy makers 
should act preventively by communicating effectively to dissipate concerns regarding what 
                                                 
17 BIS (2010) documents US banks’ exposure to Euro zone countries. 26 
market participants perceive as weaknesses. Second, since spillover effects go beyond 
sovereign debt markets, policy makers should be prepared to address possible instability in 
the banking, insurance, and non-financial sector by preparing a contingency plan. Third, as 
financial instability may stem from the existence of ratings-based regulations, policy makers 
should review the appropriateness of using credit ratings in financial markets regulation.
18  
                                                 
18  The Financial Stability Board (FSB, 2010) presents a number of principles for reducing reliance on credit 
ratings. 27 
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